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It’s late November 2002 on a drizzly, cold day in Washington,
D.C., a little more than a year after four hijacked planes crashed
into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsyl-
vania killing more than 3,000 people. In one of the bewildering
number of Starbucks off Dupont Circle, Jeff Bezos, iconoclast lead-
er of the mega online e-tailer Amazon.com, and John Poindexter,
then director of the Pentagon’s Office of Information Awareness,
meet. Bezos orders a low-fat latte. Poindexter, ex-Regan national
security advisor and a convicted felon charged with lying to Con-
gress and obstruction of justice, takes an Americano (of course).
Poindexter gets right to the point.
Poindexter: “Jeff, we have a problem. The world has changed
dramatically. During the years I was in the White House it was
relatively simple to identify our intelligence collection targets.
Today, the most serious asymmetric threat facing the United States
is terrorism, a threat characterized by collections of people loose-
ly organized in shadowy networks that are difficult to identify and
define and whose goals are the destruction of our way of life. The
intelligence collection targets are thousands of people whose iden-
tities and whereabouts we do not always know. It is somewhat
analogous to the antisubmarine warfare problem of finding sub-
marines in an ocean of noise—we must find the terrorists in a
world of noise, to understand what they are planning, and develop
options for preventing their attacks. I think the solution is largely
associated with information technology. We must become much
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more efficient and more clever in the ways we find new sources of
data, mine information, and make it available for analysis, convert
it to knowledge, and create actionable options.”
Bezos, ever the excitable boy, and looking for an opportunity to
show off to the elder Poindexter, pipes in.
Bezos: “John, this is way cool! That’s what’s really got me excit-
ed about the Internet and the ability to use technology. In the last
five years, we’ve invested $800 million in technology and we con-
tinue to spend $200 million a year.”
Poindexter: “I know, Jeff. One of the significant new data sourc-
es that needs to be mined to discover and track terrorists is the
‘transaction space.’ If terrorist organizations are going to plan and
execute attacks, their people must engage in transactions and they
will leave signatures in this information space. Currently, terror-
ists are able to move freely throughout the world, to hide when
necessary, to find sponsorship and support, to operate in small,
independent cells, and to strike infrequently, exploiting weapons
of mass effects and media response to influence governments. This
low intensity/low density form of warfare has an information sig-
nature. We must be able to pick this signal out of the noise. The
relevant information extracted from these data must be made avail-
able in large scale repositories with enhanced semantic content
for easy analysis.”
Bezos: “Despite the expense, all this feedback from customers
has its rewards. Amazon now has a vast database of customer pref-
erences and buying patterns, tied to their e-mail and postal ad-
dresses . . . Ultimately, John, we’re an information broker.”
Poindexter: “I know, Jeff. That’s why I’ve come to you. I also
know that, one year prior to the September 11 attacks—almost to
the day—you issued a notice to your customers that you gather
information about them every time they search for a product, that
you do share information among your extensive list of companies
and online partners, and that you consider customer information a
‘key asset’ that is transferable if you buy or sell associated stores.”
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Bezos: “In revising our privacy policy, we tried to take into con-
sideration not only our current activities but also those things we
could imagine possibly happening in the future.”
Poindexter: “Indeed. You were way ahead as usual, Jeff. While
our goal is total information awareness, there will always be un-
certainty and ambiguity in trying to understand what is being
planned. That’s why we need to bring people with diverse points
of view together in a collaborative environment where there is
access to all source data, discovery tools, and model building tools.
Collaboration has not been so important in the past when prob-
lems were less complex, but now it is essential.”
Bezos: “Collaboration. Oh, absolutely. This is long term orienta-
tion and a powerful vision which is shared by everybody here at the
company. The technology that we’ve built is very customer centric.
Everything that we’ve done has been around being obsessed over
customers. In fact, we’ve been tracking and profiling their shop-
ping and buying habits for years! Say, have you visited our site
lately, John? My favorite product in the kitchen store is the OXO
Salad Spinner. Read the customer reviews of that and I guarantee
you, even if you don’t like salads, you’ll buy that spinner.”
Poindexter: “Well, that’s great, Jeff. I’ll tell the wife about it. In
the mean time, my IT folks will be in touch.”
Now, as you may have guessed, this meeting between Bezos
and Poindexter never happened. Yet nearly all of what I have just
read has been said by both of these men in published interviews
and speeches.2 Of course, as a sociologist, I am most interested in
the larger, structural and cultural context of contemporary forms
of surveillance and less in the actions of a few individuals, no
matter how powerful they may be. But I use this little parable to
signal three things: 1) I expect, as we have already seen in fact, a
shift in the scope and quality of social monitoring we can likely
expect in the post 9/11 period. I would suggest that the attacks of
September 11 have provided an extraordinary opportunity for the
state to extend its “governability” (Foucault 1991) of the popula-
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tion through a new set of surveillance and control mechanisms; 2)
I would argue that the only way that the state is going to imple-
ment this kind of large scale, integrated, digitized system of sur-
veillance of the populace is through the cooperation of both cor-
porate capital and, by extension, the populace itself; and 3) I would
like to call attention to how a new digital surveillance system will
work to constitute our virtual identities as both “consumers” and
“citizens.”
The word surveillance, in the most general sense, refers to the
act of keeping a close watch on people, scrutinizing and monitor-
ing their behavior. To many, the term often brings to mind George
Orwell’s notorious “Big Brother” as depicted in the novel 1984.
Yet, when I began looking at new forms of surveillance and social
control in the mid 1990s, “Big Brother” was seemingly nowhere
to be found. Sure, there was the legacy of the COINTELL pro-
grams of the 1960s and 1970s and no doubt various individuals
and groups were being monitored by state agents, but there was
little evidence that anything like the tele-screens and oppressive
state apparatus depicted in Orwell’s novel were routinely affect-
ing the lives of the average citizen. Instead, what I found was a
raft of what I called “Tiny Brothers” increasingly present in our
workplaces, schools, homes and community institutions. These
techniques exist in the shadow of large institutions; they are not
ushered in with dramatic displays of state power, nor do they ap-
pear as significant challenges to constitutional democracy. These
are the more commonplace strategies used by both governmental,
but even more likely, private organizations to “keep us in line,”
monitor our performance, and accumulate evidence. These local,
knowledge gathering activities are often enhanced by the use of
new information, visual, communication, and medical technolo-
gies.
In my book, The Culture of Surveillance (Staples 1997) first
published in 1997and later in a revised and updated edition enti-
tled Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Postmod-
ern Life (Staples 2000), I identified an array of these tactics from
the “soft,” seemingly benign and relatively inconspicuous forms
of monitoring such as preventive shoplifting systems, marketing
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databases, “pagers” and other electronic monitoring instruments
to the “harder” more obtrusive and confrontational practices that
often begin with the assumption of guilt and are designed to un-
cover the “truth,” to test an individual’s character, and, more gen-
erally, to make people consciously aware that they are indeed be-
ing watched and monitored. These are what I call “surveillance
ceremonies.” They include random drug and alcohol testing, the
use of lie detectors, pre employment integrity tests, “sobriety check-
points” in the streets, the use of metal detectors and other types of
scanning equipment, and electronically monitored “house arrest.”
Between these soft and hard types of social control lies a vast
array of techniques and technologies exercised on and by people
both inside and outside the justice system that are designed to
watch our bodies, to regulate and monitor our activities, habits,
and movements, and, ultimately, to shape or change our behavior.
Some of these procedures are often undertaken in the name of law
and order, public safety, the protection of private property, or sim-
ply “sound business practice”; others are initiated for an individu-
al’s “own good” or benefit. But no matter what the stated motiva-
tion, the intent of surveillance as social control is to mold, shape,
and modify actions and behaviors. These rituals, I argue, are the
specific, concrete mechanisms that operate to maintain unbalanced
and unequal authority relationships. These relationships exist be-
tween specific clusters of individuals (e.g., between managers and
workers, police officers and suspects, probation officials and of-
fenders, teachers and students, parents and their children, and the
like) and, in a larger sense, between individuals and the public and
private organizations where these rituals take place.
Surveillance and social control of this type are not orchestrat-
ed by a few individuals; it is not part of a master plan that is sim-
ply imposed on us. Rather, in my view, we are all involved and
enmeshed within a matrix of highly intentional and purposeful
power relations,, arrangements that can be more or less unequal
but are never simply one directional. Moreover, sans “Big Broth-
er,” it’s not just a scary group of “Them” who are doing this to us,
either. I argue that we live in a voyeuristic and “looking” post-
modern culture as we often turn the tracking devices on ourselves.
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We offer up ourselves to the digital machines. We willingly wire
ourselves in with “cell” phones and the like as we rush to buy the
latest products that offer us access to the “net” and the “web” (the
jargon of this technology is revealing). We buy the videocams and
use them to document our own movements, or we turn them on
our friends, neighbors or strangers. We also bring home the ma-
chines to listen in on our kids’ phone calls, keep an eye on their
driving, or test them for drugs.
Now, in this previous work, my focus was primarily on the
local situations of everyday life. But the events of September 11th
and its aftermath force us to shift our attention to the institutional
level and the actions of the state and here we find what figures to
be a reconstitution of state power within a complex web of affili-
ations with civil society.
For a while it was the “war on drugs”; now it is the “war on
terrorism.” And it seems that labeling a social policy a “war” jus-
tifies the involvement of the military in it. In the Culture of Sur-
veillance, I suggested that the nation’s military industrial complex
was morphing into a “security industrial complex,” and with it we
see a blurring distinction between techniques and technologies de-
signed for “military” operations and those deployed in domestic
“security” operations. September 11th, it seems, has accelerated
this process. As part of the government’s sweeping Homeland Se-
curity agenda that includes the USAPATRIOT legislation, the Pen-
tagon is sponsoring a number of new projects purportedly designed
to weed out the suspected terrorists among us. Some of these
projects are being developed by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, or DARPA, the Pentagon’s “think tank” for new
technologies. You may have read about some of these in the news-
paper over the last couple of years. For example, there is a project
called Combat Zones That See, or CTS. Ostensibly being devel-
oped to deal with the urban warfare situations US personnel face
in Bagdad today, CTS would coordinate a multiplicity of surveil-
lance cameras, gathering their views in a single information store-
house. The goal, according to a recent Pentagon presentation to
defense contractors, is to “track everything that moves.” CTS will
keep watch by equipping each camera with a processor like the
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one in your computer. The chips will be programmed with “video
understanding algorithms” that can distinguish, say, one car from
another, the car’s speed, time of arrival, color, size, license plate,
and shape, attributes that are all instantly passed on to a central
server. By sharing only this refined data—instead of the raw video
itself—CTS should keep a vast computer network of cameras from
becoming overloaded with hours and hours of meaningless foot-
age. DARPA is also developing what they call a “LifeLog.” Life-
Log is a high tech diary of sorts, designed to create a multimedia,
digital record of everything a person sees, says, and hears, the
goal of which is to create a searchable database of human lives to
promote artificial intelligence. There are also identification sys-
tems designed to recognize a person’s face or style of walk, the
retina of the eyes, and the like (Shachtman 2003). I could go on
here but let me focus on the story of one tool under consideration.
Until August 2003, ex-Admiral John Poindexter was in charge
of the Information Awareness Office within DARPA which got
considerable attention when its program “Total Information Aware-
ness” came to light in late 2002. TIA was as “Orwellian” sounding
as anything we have seen in some time. The office symbol on a
sign outside Poindexter’s office is a cultish looking all seeing eye
atop a pyramid like on the dollar bill, peering at a globe with the
accompanying slogan “Scientia est Potentia” (“Knowledge Is Pow-
er”). TIA’s stated aim was to “connect the dots” of what Poindex-
ter refers to as the “transactions space”; to “mine” huge amounts
of information about people and thus help investigative agencies
identify potential terrorists and anticipate their activities. All the
transactions and activities that most of us engage in on a daily
basis such as credit card purchases, ATM activity, toll collection
systems, travel and telephone records, internet traffic and the like—
billions and billions of pieces of information generated by mil-
lions of people—would be culled for pre-identified patterns or
actions of say, a few hundred suspected terrorists.
So, for example, the system would supposedly be able to “con-
nect the dots” between two of the hijackers on September 11th
who were on a State Department watch list. Phone records indi-
cated that they were calling each other. They bought airline tickets
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on the same day. A search of the people they called regularly would
have uncovered other young Arab males who also had bought air-
line tickets for the same day. A more detailed search would have
revealed that several had attended flight schools together. A com-
puter program trolling the Internet for these indicators would have
popped up a red flag. Moreover, TIA could jack into video feeds
from surveillance cameras as well as the emerging biometric data-
bases of those facial and other assorted recognition systems to
trace the movements of suspected terrorists.
Of course, DARPA doesn’t actually conduct any of its own
research. That’s “outsourced” to corporations and our colleagues
at universities around the country.
For example, the Office of Information Awareness has award-
ed 13 contracts to Booz Allen & Hamilton amounting to more
than $23 million; Lockheed Martin Corporation had 23 contracts
worth $27 million; the Schafer Corporation had 9 contracts total-
ing $15 million. Other prominent contractors involved in the TIA
program include SRS Technologies, Adroit Systems, CACI Dy-
namic Systems, Syntek Technologies, and ASI Systems Interna-
tional. In addition, at least 24 universities received almost $10
million during the last five years to do research on TIA related
projects. Some of the largest grants went to Cornell, Columbia,
and UC Berkeley (Mayle and Knott 2002).
After it was made public, TIA came under attack from civil
libertarians, privacy groups, and lawmakers across the political
spectrum. “This could be the perfect storm for civil liberties in
America,” said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Priva-
cy Information Center. “The vehicle is the Homeland Security Act,
the technology is DARPA, and the agency is the FBI. The out-
come is a system of national surveillance of the American
Public”(Markoff 2002). In February 2003, Senate and House con-
ferees agreed to impose severe restrictions on TIA. Virtually with-
out dissent, the House conferees accepted a bipartisan Senate pro-
vision stipulating that the program cannot be used against Ameri-
can citizens and that it would be shut down in 90 days unless the
Pentagon submitted a detailed report on the program’s cost, goals,
impact on civil liberties and prospects for success against terror-
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ists. In response to the firestorm of controversy over TIA, Penta-
gon officials delivered their report to Congress in May. In it they
announced that they were changing the name of the project from
“Total Information Awareness” to “Terrorist Information Aware-
ness” and declared:
The Department of Defense . . . has expressed its full commit-
ment to planning, executing, and overseeing the TIA program
in a manner that protects privacy and civil liberties. Safeguard-
ing the privacy and the civil liberties of Americans is a bedrock
principle. DoD intends to make it a central element in the De-
partment of Defense’s management and oversight of the TIA
program...
Few critics were appeased by the DoD move and many contended
that a prototype is already in place and has been used in tests by
military intelligence organizations. In late July, the Senate voted
to cut off funding for TIA, prohibiting the Defense Department to
spend any portion of its $369 billion budget on the Terrorism In-
formation Awareness program and ignoring a request by the Bush
administration to keep the program going. Following this debacle,
Poindexter found himself in yet another controversy with his plan
to set up an online speculative futures trading place called “Policy
Analysis Market” that would have rewarded investors who fore-
cast terrorist attacks, assassinations and coups. Declared a “light-
ning rod” for contestations, the Pentagon asked Poindexter to re-
sign.
So, what do these events portend? First, despite the minor set-
back in the story of TIA, we are likely to see a shift in the scope
and quality of the social monitoring we will experience. In practi-
cal terms, the new national security agenda and variants of pro-
grams like TIA will surely deepen the “culture of surveillance”
that we currently live in. This is hardly stunning news. Given the
implications of the USAPATRIOT Act, the creation of a cabinet
level Homeland Security agency with a $30 billion budget, and a
burgeoning state apparatus set out to monitor the populace, there
is bound to be more watching going on. It seems to me that Sep-
tember 11th provides an extraordinary opportunity for the state to
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extend its “governability” of the population through a new set of
surveillance and control mechanisms. This form of bureaucratic
power, what Foucault called “governmentality,” is centered on
techniques to identify, classify, and manage “risk” populations
through continuous monitoring. Will this finally be the arrival of
“Big Brother?” I doubt it. This process began in the 19th century
with public health movements, formal census taking, the inven-
tions of the birth certificate and passport, and the like. These latest
moves seem fairly consistent with the evolution of the liberal state
apparatus.
Secondly, the current situation also tells us that the only way
that the state is going to implement this kind of large scale, inte-
grated, digitized system of surveillance of the populace is through
the cooperation of both corporate capital and, by extension, the
populace itself. By this I mean a number of things. The state needs
the corporations to provide the technical know-how to build and
maintain the system. Was it foresight that the Pentagon’s DARPA,
responsible for the creation of the Internet, will now use it, and the
commercial technology designed by the likes of Microsoft and
IBM will enhance as a capillary network, connecting computer to
computer to data mine the minutiae our daily lives? The digital
network, our banks, credit cards, on line purchases that have be-
come so much a part of our daily lives as consumers —including
many of the “Tiny Brothers” that I documented in my book— will
become the architecture for this giant monitoring network. More-
over, the public will likely resist attempts by the state to watch
them if the actions appear to be top-down and hence “Big Brother-
ish.” This was the lesson of the failed “Total Information Aware-
ness” program. As a former high ranking naval officer who served
with Poindexter characterized him, “John Poindexter is a brilliant
nuclear engineer who is also politically tone deaf” (Markoff 2003).
Poindexter et. al. need to learn from the likes of Jeff Bezos that a
jack boot on the neck will raise the hackles of the public, but offer
them great prices and free shipping and people will gladly hand
over their “personal information.” Or as neo-liberal Nikolas Rose
puts it, “To govern humans is not to crush their capacity to act, but
to acknowledge it and use it for one’s own objectives.” (Rose 1999,
133
The Culture of Surveillance Revisited
p. 4). Seduced by the market’s desires and overwhelming depen-
dence on it, we are willingly feeding our data into the machines.
To paraphrase Mark Poster, we become “individuals plugged into
the circuits of our own panoptic control” (Poster 1996, p. 184).
The Pentagon will act as the broker, drawing, as it has in the past,
on the minds of university professors and profit hungry corpora-
tions, to bring it all together. So in order to avoid the political
ineptitude of John Poindexter and be deployed successfully, this
kind of surveillance will need to be designed into the flows of
everyday existence, dispersed, and de-centered, operating in the
background. Much like shopping online, we’ll hardly know that it
exists.
Finally, and relatedly, I would like to call attention to how a
new digital surveillance system will work to constitute our virtual
identities as both “consumers” and “citizens.” “Computerized da-
tabases are nothing but performative machines,” Poster tells us,
“engines for producing retrievable identities” (Poster 1996, p. 186).
If the new system is built around monitoring our activity in the so
called “transaction space,” then we will be subjected to judge-
ments—“normalizing judgements,” in Foucault’s terms—as to
what constitutes a proper consumer profile and thereby be declared
a “safe citizen” vs. someone “at risk” (whatever that means). In
other words, we will need, in part, to act out our role as good con-
sumers in order to prove our worthiness as good citizens thus bind-
ing these two identities together. This is a fitting “homeland securi-
ty” program for a society that, as Henry Giroux puts it, “equates
profit making with the essence of democracy and consumption as
the ultimate privilege of citizenship” (Giroux 2002, p.12).
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